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This paper describes the transformation of a software development organization in 
Australia and theorizes the learning and knowledge construction processes which this 
entailed.  Faced with changes to the regulatory environment of the organization, key 
stakeholders engaged in the processes of learning how to create the conditions under 
which a new ‘insurgent’ organization, focused upon innovation, could emerge from 
the old ‘incumbent’ organization without disruption to revenue flows during the two-
year transitional period. The paper explicates these learning processes, and the form 
of praxis that underpinned them, and shows the critical role played by external 
stakeholders, such as customers, to the success of the praxis. A key insight gained 
from the project was the crucial role played by social capital - in particular, relational 
and identity resources – in the collaborative learning practices through which 
knowledge, relevant and pertinent to the purpose of the project, was constructed and 
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This paper describes and theorizes the transformation of a software development 
company in Australia in response to impending changes in its regulatory environment.  
Although profitable and dominant in its niche Australasian freight forwarding and 
customs brokerage software market, the company needed to transform itself from a 
complacent ‘incumbent’, focussed on operational excellence, into a challenging 
‘insurgent’, focussed on innovation.  In broad terms, the transformation required 
organizational leadership that could apply Schumpeter’s theory of ‘creative 
destruction’ and focus on the creation of ‘learning contexts’ in which the requisite 
knowledge would be constructed [1]. 
 
We hope to contribute to existing theoretical perspectives by means of an analysis of 
the role of social capital as a means to producing the collaboration required for the 
construction of knowledge and innovation.  We argue that social capital theory offers 
a valuable explanatory framework for organizational transformation, and that strategic 
leadership practices need to facilitate the development of all three dimensions of 
social capital – structural, cognitive, and relational – for transformation to be 
successful. Furthermore, we argue that facilitative learning contexts are characterized 
by a form of praxis whereby the dialectical relationship between theory and action, 
context and cognition, individual and community, strategy and purpose, is recognized 
and sustained for the duration of any knowledge-construction endeavour. 
 
Background to the Study 
By November 2001, after eight years of consistent growth, Eagle Datamation 
International (EDI) had risen to dominance (70% market share) in the Australasian 
market for freight forwarding and customs brokerage software.  The primary source 
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of this success had been its legacy product, Deliverance, but proposed regulatory 
changes to the industry meant that a new product line had to be developed within a 
two-year time frame if EDI was to sustain its local dominance and extend it beyond 
Australasia.  
 
This strategic inflection point in EDI’s competitive situation provided the impetus for 
the CEO to transform EDI’s strategy to one based upon ongoing innovation [2].  
However, given EDI’s dependence during this period of transformation on the 
revenues generated from its legacy product, the operational excellence of the ‘old’ 
organization would have to be managed simultaneously with the transformation of the 
business, and the requisite knowledge would have to be developed in situ [3].  
 
The strategic transformation was preceded by a lengthy period of discussion and 
analysis by the CEO and the university- based learning facilitator on the nature of 
knowledge.  Consensus was reached on the assumption that knowledge is grounded in 
human interests, and that therefore knowledge construction in organizations is a 
means of serving stakeholder interests.  These interests would transform concurrently 
with the contexts that give them meaning, and therefore the knowledge that serves 
them would be emergent – it would not develop into a fixed state but would always be 
a ‘work in progress’.  Knowledge would be constructed as it was required, through the 
dialectical relationship between the context and the stakeholder interests that inform 
that context.   
  
The alignment of multiple and shifting social contexts and stakeholder interests would 
require strategic vigilance and high levels of commitment from all stakeholders.  Such 
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commitment would be generated by the alignment of the project mission with the 
personal purpose and interests of these stakeholders. 
  
In order to leverage the knowledge resources embedded in the knowledge-interests of 
the stakeholders and in the social contexts of their relationships with each other, 
particular forms of relationship and communication would need to be facilitated by 
the Odyssey project.  This led to the choice of a form of praxis – a collaborative form 
of action and critique - as the most appropriate learning methodology for the project. 
Through praxis, ‘grounded’ theory developed from experience would continuously 
inform, and transform, existing theoretical frames of reference in ways that would 
uphold the theory-action dialectic [4].  Such processes would ensure that the tacit 
knowledge generated through experience (action) and shared through processes of 
socialization amongst project stakeholders, is made explicit through collaborative 
articulation processes.  Once explicit, such insights can be refined into precise terms 
that are able to re-form the theoretical frameworks that guide the strategic direction of 
the project in order to ensure that knowledge that is relevant and pertinent to a 
regularly re-viewed mission is constructed [5]. 
 
Framing the Strategic Action 
The transformation of EDI into an innovation-focussed organization involved two 
main strategies.  The first of these was that of ‘creative destruction’ – the destruction 
of the old business while it was still profitable and the creation, within its midst, of a 
new business that would ensure the long-term survival of the organization. Rather 
than attempting to transform the old business through the creation of an off-site 
‘skunkworks’, the CEO chose the more difficult strategy of developing new 
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innovative capabilities within the existing operating context of EDI [6]. As an 
established ‘incumbent’, EDI had developed a culture of complacency and the CEO 
decided that rather than attempt the difficult and slow task of transforming the mental 
models, or sets of assumptions about themselves, others and ‘the way the world 
works’, of existing staff, he would recruit new staff for the development of the new 
business [7].  
 
The second strategy was the creation of appropriate learning contexts for the new 
business – represented by the Odyssey project - wherein the knowledge required for 
the successful implementation of the mission would be constructed.  The catch-phrase 
‘the strategy is the culture’ was coined by the CEO as the guiding principle in this 
respect.  The culture was to be created through the location of talented software 
developers within a flat, team-based, structure; the use of an agile programming 
methodology known as Extreme Programming (XP); and through a set of self-
management practices intended to create the conditions for authentic collaboration 
among them.  Through this culture the CEO hoped to sustain creativity amongst these 
empowered individuals for periods long enough to enable its conversion into 
innovative products and services.  
 
The First Phase of the Praxis 
The newly recruited team of eight software developers was located at one end of 
EDI’s large open-plan office, and was issued with t-shirts bearing the Odyssey logo.  
This was part of the strategy of creating a unique identity for the team and signaling to 
the other staff the special status of the project.  The CEO, as a member of the Odyssey 
team, had his desk relocated to the centre of the team’s work area.   
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The CEO briefed the team on the mission of the project, which was the replacement, 
within two years, of the legacy product, Deliverance, by a new web and desktop 
enabled suite of products aimed a global market.  In order to achieve this, the team 
was empowered to the point of self-management and would be given all the resources 
it needed.   
 
No explanation for the introduction, and special treatment, of the Odyssey team was 
offered to the ‘old’ EDI staff by the CEO.  Rather than trying to persuade members of 
staff about the need for cultural change at EDI, the strategy of the CEO was to tacitly 
appeal to them to voluntarily ‘migrate’ to the project; an act through which they 
would be demonstrating the flexibility of their orientation to work and learning, and 
thus their suitability for membership of the new EDI culture.    
 
After two months, the first formal analysis of the project action took place. This 
analysis incorporated a series of discussions amongst the team members and a set of 
interviews with members by the university-based observer.  From these, it became 
clear that the initial theoretical framework for the strategic action was not delivering 
the anticipated results and that the team was not exploiting the potential of a flat 
organizational form.  Despite their excellent technical skills the new recruits were 
demonstrating inflexibility of mind, limited capacity to collaborate and, as a 
consequence of years of socialization in technology-orientated settings, inappropriate 
assumptions concerning knowledge construction.  This had resulted in little work of 
value being produced during the first two months of the project and personality 
clashes and power struggles within the team.  The more experienced members were 
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calling for the installation of a supreme coach - someone who would provide overall 
direction and have ultimate technical authority in the team. 
 
Two other important issues emerged from the interviews conducted by the university-
based observer.  Firstly, despite the original briefing, few members of the team 
understood the Odyssey mission, and thought that it was to upgrade the legacy 
product, Deliverance.  No follow-up work had been done to ensure their 
understanding of it or its relevance to each member’s personal interests.  As a 
consequence, the mission was not working as a mobilizing and unifying force 
amongst team members.  
 
Secondly, the interviews showed that the developers were preoccupied with technical 
aspects of their work and that the primary source of work satisfaction was task 
related.  Generally, learning within the project appeared to be a predominantly 
individual endeavour, restricted to technical forms of learning, and narrowly focussed 
on functional, as opposed to strategic, activities. 
 
The results of the first formal analysis of the project indicated that three inappropriate 
assumptions were undermining its implementation.  In the first instance, a central 
power culture was an historical feature of EDI, with the CEO dominating all decision-
making within the company [8].  Furthermore, his clear technical superiority over all 
other staff had resulted in what he colloquially referred to as, a ‘truck factor of 1’ (the 
number of people in the organization who would have to be hit by a truck in order for 
the organisation to fail).  In an organization totally dependent upon him, the 
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assumption that all he had to do was to create a team structure and leave it to the 
members to exploit the resultant culture for innovative purposes, was flawed.   
 
Secondly, whilst structure will normally facilitate the development of a particular 
culture over time, in rapidly changing environments this process needs to be 
accelerated.  Given the time frame, the assumption that the structure alone would 
create the learning contexts through which the mission-critical knowledge would be 
constructed was inappropriate.  Thus the need for leadership practices able to 
accelerate the development of strong relationship bonds, profound levels of 
communication, and a sense of shared purpose among stakeholders (as articulated in 
the discussions prior to the project) was overlooked in the implementation of the first 
phase of the praxis.  
  
Thirdly, around this time, a fortuitous observation by the CEO contributed a key 
insight into the failure of the Odyssey team to deliver expected results.  Outside the 
Odyssey team, a programmer who had experienced many problems with a product 
started to show dramatic improvement in his productivity and in the quality of his 
work.  The CEO noticed that these positive changes occurred from the moment that 
this programmer had engaged real clients with real problems in trying to use his 
system.  In a moment of insight, he realised that an important missing ingredient in 
the Odyssey team was that of a real customer.  Thus, although the importance of 
customers’ knowledge interests and knowledge resources had been recognized in the 
discussions that framed the first phase of the praxis as crucial to the success of the 
knowledge construction processes, this issue had been overlooked in the strategic 
implementation of the project.  A key reason for this was the assumption held by the 
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team that XP’s definition of a customer – one that allowed an ‘internal’ person such 
as the CEO to play this role – was adequate. 
 
Re-Forming the Theoretical Frameworks and Re-Newing the Strategic Action 
The key learning gained by the CEO resulted in three immediate actions.  Firstly, he 
introduced the team to the core protocols, a set of practices advocated by McCarthy & 
McCarthy that provided for the on-going workshopping of mission, vision and values 
(or the ‘core’) in the interests of aligning members’ personal ‘core’ with that of the 
project1 [9].  
 
Secondly, he introduced morning ‘stand-up’ meetings that commenced with a ‘check-
in’ procedure (from the core protocols) in which each team member spoke briefly on 
their current state of ‘emotional being’, and whereby a degree of emotional 
connectedness was achieved between team members at the commencement of work 
each day.  This created the inter-subjective conditions under which a shared future 
could be debated and discussed and the knowledge interests of team members could 
be explored, understood and aligned with those of the other team members.  In 
addition, he introduced ‘alignment meetings’ as social occasions where team 
members shared their life goals and life scripts.  Through the introduction and 
management of these practices, the CEO accepted an active coaching role in the team 
with the intention of creating the conditions under which members would take greater 
ownership of the strategic leadership of the project, and invest greater levels of 
commitment and energy in the processes of its implementation.  The intention was to 
increase the ‘truck factor’ of EDI. 
                                                 
1 The process outlined by McCarthy & McCarthy was judged by the team to be too ‘evangelical’ for 
the Australian cultural context and was thus modified appropriately for use in the Odyssey team. 
 10
Thirdly, he introduced real customers on a full-time basis to the team.  In this way he 
created opportunities for effective communication between team members and EDI’s 
real customers in order for them to understand the knowledge resources and interests 
each brought to the knowledge construction encounters.  
 
Analysis of the Second Phase of Strategic Action 
Four months later, a second formal analysis of the project was undertaken.  Over this 
period, an impressive increase in value appeared to have been created through 
multiple new products that reflected a broad product range, and collaborative product 
development processes that included real customers.  In response to the observation 
that there seemed to be greater trust between team members, the CEO acknowledged 
that ‘at some indefinable point’ the team had ‘started to feel like a family’. This had 
been visible to the observer in the morning ‘stand-up’ meetings over several weeks, 
where team members had begun to express their sense of the significance of the 
project to their professional and personal lives.  A growing sense of a covenantal 
culture – of the Odyssey team having a shared destiny that was important to each of 
them – was evident in team meetings.  Furthermore, whilst members still disagreed on 
many things, such conflict was oriented around issues central to the purpose of the 
Odyssey project.  This demonstrated the emergence of relationships characterized by 
the creative abrasion referred to by Leonard-Barton as being essential for the 
development of an innovation-supporting culture [10]. 
 
An incident that occurred during a visit by the observer demonstrated the role of more 
constructive power management practices by the CEO in creating an optimal learning 
context.  A member of the team lost an entire client database from the company’s 
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main web system, and when he approached the CEO expecting to be fired the CEO 
calmly asked him whether he could recover the database.  Within a few hours, with 
encouragement from the CEO, the database had been recovered.  The fact that there 
had been no penalty, emotional or otherwise, for this mistake made a lasting 
impression on the team member, as he related afterwards to the university-based 
observer: 
After we had fixed the problem, he (the CEO) said to me, ‘We should 
allow people to make mistakes and learn from their mistakes.’ This was 
very valuable for me because after that I felt very secure. I will never 
forget this. I now feel secure in the team, in the company, and I am 
motivated to achieve targets. 
 
 
These observations of the positive development of relationships in the project were 
supported by the second set of interviews conducted with the eight original team 
members (by this stage the team had grown in number to fourteen members).  In these 
interviews, team members’ accounts of their daily work experience depicted a culture 
that promoted knowledge-construction activities and family-like mutual support.  The 
team was described as having developed into a community of friends who take their 
work, each other, and their responsibilities towards each other, very seriously while 
simultaneously having fun together.  The more experienced programmers commented 
that the project now provided an ideal work situation.  One member said that he could 
not conceive of a better place to work; another commented that, 
The atmosphere we have here could not be found easily somewhere else. 
It is friendly, we laugh, we kid each other sometimes but we are serious in 
the work. We have fun at work and I have some very good friends. At our 
alignment meetings, everybody talks about their goals, what bothers them, 
what makes them happy, you know, things like that.  I tell everybody that 
I don’t like this or I like that and I know that everybody will try to fix 
these problems. I feel that I am in a dynamic team with people who are 
concerned, people who care about me, and I feel very good.  
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The interviews reflected clarity amongst members that the purpose of the project was 
the replacement of the legacy freight forwarding software system (Deliverance) by a 
market-leading application (Odyssey) that will strengthen and expand EDI’s share of 
the global (as opposed to regional) freight forwarding software market.  Similarly, 
with each using almost exactly the same words, members saw a ‘team’ as a group of 
people working together towards the attainment of a shared goal.  Compared to the 
situation described in earlier interviews, this clarity and consistency of perception of 
the mission of the project and of the concept of a team amongst these members, 
provided strong evidence of the success of the core protocols and other team-building 
processes introduced by the CEO during the second phase of strategic action in the 
project.  
 
Furthermore, members perceived a relationship between the concepts of a shared goal 
and communication.  As one member argued, without effective communication 
collective action cannot be aligned with the shared goal: 
The most important aspect of teamwork is good communication.  It’s 
number one. If you don’t have communication, you don’t have a team 
because unless you have coherent communication within the group, you 
cannot be sure that you do have a common goal. 
 
 
Members raised the importance of trust, linking it to the phenomenon of knowing 
others well.  As one member put it, trust involves knowing what you can depend upon 
someone to do and knowing what you cannot depend upon that person to do: 
What is crucial is trust in your team mates, and that goes along with 
knowledge of them. You know what they can do and you trust they will do 
what you know they can do. Part of that trust is also knowing what you 
can’t depend on them for. If you know what they can’t do, then you know 
that if you ask them to do something like that, that you have to take on the 
responsibility of following up on them or helping them out. 
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The interviews also provided evidence of members increasingly taking personal 
responsibility for honouring the trust that other members placed in them: 
I think that the most important thing I have learned from being on the 
Odyssey team is responsibility.  I feel a lot of responsibility because 
people depend on what I do in order to be able to progress the work. When 
I get a task to do, they trust me to do it well.  If I neglect it, or I don’t do it 
well, eventually someone is going to have to come back and fix it up. So, I 
have accepted the responsibility of doing something well. In order for the 
whole team to work together effectively each person in the team has to do 
a good job on exactly what they are responsible to do. 
 
 
Members showed far greater awareness of social dynamics as a key aspect of 
successful knowledge construction practices. While technical aspects such as 
developing new skills, exposure to new technologies, and recognising the benefits of a 
trade-off between what works and what is technically elegant were still important to 
them, members were now primarily motivated by more social dimensions of their 
work.  Their membership of a dynamic community of practice that has a common and 
visible goal, the attainment of which is seen as a personal responsibility, had 
facilitated a more fulfilling way of working (and living) and this had encouraged 
within the team a sense of mutual ‘ownership’ of the project, as one member 
expressed it: 
A while ago Richard (the CEO) was talking about something and he said, 
‘I want to keep this business going’. I realised then that I want this 
business to be going as much as he wants it to go because it is my 
business. I really want to improve the company because I am part of the 
company. We are a group of people who have the same goal and interests. 
 
 
As a consequence of this growing capacity amongst all team members to take 
responsibility for action and to solve problems quickly through self-reflexive work 
practices and collaborative modes of learning, the locus of action appeared to be 
shifting from the CEO to the team itself. 
 14
Managing Incompatible Cultures 
By this stage, three camps, which the CEO referred to as the ‘In’, the ‘In-coming’, 
and the ‘Out’ groups, had developed within EDI. The Odyssey team was ‘In’.  The 
‘In-coming’ group referred to those ‘old’ EDI staff attempting to connect to the 
project in various ways.  One Odyssey team member had been given the task of 
facilitating the entry of these individuals into the team.  
 
A significant number of the ‘old’ EDI staff, however, remained in the ‘Out’ group. 
Feeling betrayed by the CEO, they showed resentment towards the Odyssey project 
and posed an ethical dilemma for the CEO who, given their loyalty to the company 
over a significant number of years, felt obligated to continue their employment at 
EDI.   
 
The Third Phase of Formal Analysis of the Odyssey Project 
Six months later, and one year into the project, the external observer conducted a 
‘focus group’ session with the original Odyssey team members.  During this meeting, 
they claimed that, in spite of the growth of the Odyssey team, the project was on target 
in terms of its mission and the team was as bonded, and the communication as rich, as 
that depicted in the previous analysis.  ‘Stand-Up’ meetings and ‘Check-Ins’ remained 
a daily practice although there were fewer alignment meetings.  Regarding the 
transformation of EDI as an organization, they claimed that some staff remained 
outside the Odyssey project and were ignorant of its purpose and relevance.  
 
In an interview with the CEO, he estimated that, at that stage, the Odyssey team 
comprised approximately thirty-five members; that there were approximately ten staff 
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who were ‘boundary spanners’ (partly ‘inside’ and partly ‘outside’ the team); and ten 
staff who remained ‘outside’ the Odyssey project.  Of these, he argued that five were 
constrained by the function they perform, in terms of their capacity to move into the 
team, while the other five had ‘attitude problems’ and were unlikely ever to join the 
Odyssey team.  On the ethical-cum-strategic issue of what to do about these staff, he 
remained unsure. 
 
Evaluation of Mission Implementation One Year into the Odyssey Project 
Thus far a broad range of new software products has been developed with current and 
potential revenues far in excess of those generated by legacy Deliverance products. 
Furthermore, new global markets for EDI customs brokerage products have opened 
recently as a consequence of global political events.  For example, the USA, as part of 
its ‘homeland security’ drive, is mandating much stricter and more complex 
international customs requirements.  This has put pressure on Asian countries, 
traditionally slow to take up customs procedures, to adopt more standardized 
procedures, thereby opening up potential new markets for EDI products. 
  
Regarding the success of the simultaneous management of the two contradictory 
cultures within EDI over the past year, key financial indicators reflect a healthy 
situation.  Current cash holdings are significantly better than before the start of the 
Odyssey project (assisted, to some extent, by asset sales), and EDI is still profitable in 
spite of significant investment in the Odyssey project (especially through the 
employment of a significant number of additional staff).  Just over one year into the 
Odyssey project, 80% of EDI’s revenue still is derived from Deliverance products 
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although this is changing rapidly as new customs regulations become law in 
Singapore (1 January, 2003) and Australia (1 November, 2003). 
 
Key Learning Gained from the Project Praxis 
The strategic leadership practices involved in the transformation of EDI can best be 
theorized in the terms provided by social capital theory.  Nahapiet & Ghoshal define 
social capital as the ‘sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit’ [11].  They have identified social capital as relevant in the 
context of facilitating innovation, pointing out that innovation depends upon resource 
combination (in terms of internally-held knowledge resources) and exchange (where 
knowledge resources are held by external parties).   
 
In the context of the transformation of EDI, it was identity social capital resources that 
generated commitment from members to act for the benefit of the team and that 
created a learning context able to sustain the necessary spirals of praxis.  Where 
mission-relevant knowledge must be constructed continuously within constantly 
transforming social contexts of learning, the key issue is not simply how resources are 
accessed and exchanged, but why stakeholders in the organization should continue to 
invest in the process.  In this respect, it was identity resources that underpinned the 
capacity of stakeholders to shape and shift their identities in such a way as to facilitate 
a new sense of their agency, and a willingness and capacity to act for the benefit of 
the project in new and different roles than their previous perceptions of self allowed.  
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The initial phases of planning had put in place two of the three strategic dimensions 
required for the generation of social capital [12].  The structural and cognitive 
dimensions were provided for, firstly, in the choice of a team structure, with its 
emphasis upon equality of status, shared identity, and collective responsibility for 
results [13]; and, secondly, in the choice of XP methodology with practices such as 
pair programming and the rotation of programmers within the pairs every three 
weeks.  This facilitated resource combination, reduced the ‘stickiness’ of tacit 
knowledge, and developed the absorptive capacity of the collective with respect to 
knowledge transfer [14].  Working together in this way, team members developed 
important knowledge resources such as shared languages, codes, experience, mental 
models, narratives and, thus, compatible world-views – all aspects of the cognitive 
dimension of social capital. 
 
Most importantly, the structural and cognitive dimensions were provided for in the 
choice of praxis as the core learning methodology.  The ongoing cycles of 
collaborative action and critique allowed for the sharing of intellectual resources and, 
in turn, enabled the ongoing transformation of theoretical frames of reference.  The 
structural and cognitive dimensions alone, however, proved to be insufficient to 
ensure the success of the praxis.  What was overlooked initially was the relational 
dimension of social capital.  Although the team had access to everyday face-to-face 
encounters with each other, the superficial nature of the communication that 
characterized these encounters failed to build trust - the most critical of all social 
capital resources.  Without trust, other key social capital resources such as shared 
commitment, norms of reciprocity, voluntary cooperation, and shared identity could 
not be developed.  
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As the Odyssey team was new to EDI, it had no shared historical experience.  In the 
absence of such historical identity resources, it was important to create a sense of 
‘futuricity’.  This required the constant endorsement of a meaningful shared mission 
and vision of the future (one which offered not only sustainable employment but a life 
purpose and a creative way of work/life) through the core protocol practices.  
 
The construction of a shared purpose required bonded relationships between team 
members created by means of opportunities to ‘get to know one another’ through 
more profound forms of communication [15].  The introduction of the morning 
‘stand-up’ and evening ‘alignment’ meetings facilitated such forms of emotionally-
charged, inter-subjective engagement among team members.  Within a few months, 
these practices enabled the creation and leveraging of powerful identity resources 
within the team, and ensured the efficacy of the other two dimensions of social 
capital.  Linked to this was the realisation of the need for similar engagement with 
stakeholders located outside of the organization (Burt refers to access to network 
relationships external to the organization, as bridging social capital) [16].  In 
particular, meaningful engagement with customers, in order to facilitate mutual 
understanding of knowledge interests, and with the university partner-in-learning with 
respect to the accurate reading of the praxis, has been recognized as crucial to the 
success of the project.  Thus, both bonding and bridging social capital have proved 
vital for innovation at EDI as strong links between internal and external networks of 
knowledge resources were essential for successful stakeholder learning, change, and 
knowledge construction..  
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The knowledge construction process at EDI shows that without trust, and a powerful 
shared vision of the future, it is highly unlikely that a group of people will commit to 
such an intellectually and emotionally demanding task.  In this case, where urgent 
transformation was necessary, the creation and leveraging of social capital resources 
proved critical to the rapid construction of mission-pertinent knowledge by the 
Odyssey team. Regarding the role of strategic leadership in the construction of 
relevant learning contexts for the project, the critical action was that of facilitating the 
team members’ identification with the project’s core (mission, vision and values) and 
of creating opportunities for authentic inter-subjective engagement amongst all 
stakeholders. However, sustaining the meaningfulness of the learning endeavours for 
all stakeholders, and thereby ensuring continuous processes of organizational renewal, 
will require committed strategic vigilance by the entire stakeholder community.  
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